The game of chess is a very popular sport and entertainment
in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. In Armenia, it is even a compulsory subject in
primary and secondary schools. Yet, despite the fact that this game is so well
mastered at a national level, Armenia finds itself in a very difficult position
on the chessboard of regional politics in the South Caucasus, especially after
the escalation in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016.
With two out of its four borders with neighbouring countries
closed and with no direct railway connection with Russia – the largest country
in the South Caucasus neighbourhood, Armenia is by definition in a difficult
geographical position. But the two closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey
are solely the result of Armenia’s own actions. Military aggression and the
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan led to
the closure of these borders more than 20 years ago. Despite the recognition of
these territories as belonging to Azerbaijan and condemnation of the aggression
by the international community, Armenia is continuing its occupation while
pretending to want peaceful negotiations.
It is this kind of policy from Armenia that has meant the
protracted efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict peacefully have so
far failed to bear fruit. The military escalation in April 2016 served as a
reminder that this conflict is a very real threat to regional and international
security. It attracted a lot of media attention and generated a political
momentum for the larger powers to return their attention to the issue. What is
more interesting is that Armenia’s post-escalation situation can be described
in chess terms as Zugzwang. This is when a chess player finds themselves
in the position that will be worsened by any possible move.
The April 2016 escalation clearly revealed the military
capabilities of Azerbaijan, which delivered an asymmetrical response to the
artillery shelling of its civilian population that lives along the front
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armies. This was the first time that
Azerbaijan used its military power in a counter-offensive with the aim of
pushing back Armenian artillery positions and securing its civilian
populations. That operation was successful. Azerbaijan was even able to
liberate some of its internationally-recognised territory. This was not the
kind of mythical “failed blitzkrieg” that some analysts tried to paint it as.
Had this been the case, the operation would be directed at very different
geographical positions and would not have targeted artillery positions. Rather,
it would be concentrated on “drilling in” deep into the hostile territory to
establish positions there.
One of the results of April 2016 escalation was the end of
the myth of the ‘impregnable’ Armenian defence on the line of contact. It
showed that Armenia will be unable to hold its military positions on the
occupied territories should Azerbaijan choose to use Article 51 of the UN
Charter and exercise its inherent right to self-defence to liberate the
occupied territories using force. The moves now available to Armenia can only
weaken its position. Going into the military standoff with Azerbaijan and
choosing war will only lead to bloodshed that will end with Armenia’s military
defeat. This would deprive the country of the scarce resources it still has. On
the other hand, choosing peace and still trying to maintain control over the
occupied territories of Azerbaijan through the continued pretence of peaceful
negotiations will worsen Armenia’s already dreadful economic situation and may
weaken its internal situation to the point of making it an altogether failed
state.
It is clear that whichever move Armenia chooses, be it war
or peace, its situation will only deteriorate. On the other hand, withdrawal
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan may give Armenia the chance to
abandon its hopeless chess game and bring peace and economic development to the
region.
Kamal Makili-Aliyev
Doctor habilitatus of Laws
04.08.2016
0 comments: